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ABSTRAK
Desa adat di Bali menjadi lokus penting dari alat negara dalam penanggulangan pande-
mi Covid-19. Sejarah relasi desa adat dengan negara berlangsung sejak masa pra-kolo-
nial hingga kini. Pasang surut hubungan tersebut menunjukkan bahwa keberagaman 
adat dan budaya desa (desa mawacara) akan selalu berada dibawah bayang-bayang 
penataan (kuasa) dari negara (negara mawatata). Narasi simbolik desa mawacara, ne-
gara mawatata menunjukkan kuasa pengaturan yang dilakukan oleh negara terhadap 
desa adat. Perda No. 4 Tahun 2019 tentang Desa Adat di Bali dan kebijakan satuan tugas 
gotong royong berbasis desa adat adalah pilihan rasional yang dilakukan oleh Gubernur 
Bali untuk merangkul dan menjadikan desa adat sebagai ujung tombak penanggulang-
an Covid-19 di seluruh Bali. Bingkai teori menggunakan perspektif governmentality 
atau kepengaturan dan kekuasaan dari Foucault yang diadopsi oleh Li (2012). Metode 
pengumpulan data menggunakan teks dari berita media massa sebagai analisis wacana 
yang dipadukan dengan wawancara mendalam dan observasi partisipasi. Artikel ini 
berargumentasi kebijakan negara terhadap desa adat di Bali memiliki sejarah panjang 
intervensi (mempengaruhi) sekaligus kooptasi (pembungkaman). Pada masa pande-
mi Covid-19 di Bali, negara menyadari betul vitalitas dan pengaruh desa adat untuk 
mengendalikan warganya. Negara dengan sadar memanfaatkan hal tersebut untuk 
menunjukkan wajah Negara pada desa adat yang telah dikooptasi terlebih dahulu. 
Kata kunci: Desa Mawacara, Negara Mawatata, kebijakan, desa adat, kooptasi, inter-
vensi
ABSTRACT 
Balinese customary villages are at the center of the state’s strategy for mitigation of Co-
vid-19. Relations between customary villages and the state predate colonial times. The 
historical dynamics have shown that the traditions and cultures of customary villages 
(desa mawacara) will always exist within the shadow of the state (negara mawatata). 
The symbolic narrative of desa mawacara, negara mawatata illustrates the govern-
mentality that the state exercises over the villages. Regional Regulation No. 4/2019 
on Customary Villages in Bali and the formation of the customary village-based task 
force were rational choices made by the Governor of Bali to place the villages at the 
forefront of the province’s strategy against the pandemic. This article employs Li’s 
(2012) adaptation of Foucault’s concept of governmentality in its analysis. Discourse 
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analysis was conducted with regards to information extracted from mass media, in-
depth interviews, and participatory observation. This article argues that the state’s 
policies for Balinese customary villages are deeply entrenched in its long history of 
intervention and cooptation. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the state has been well 
aware of the extensive influence that customary villages hold over their communities. 
The state utilizes this reality to exert its authority. 
Keywords: Desa Mawacara, Negara Mawatata, policy, customary villages, cooptation, 
intervention
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INTRODUCTION
Ring Bali sampun kaloktah
Wenten desa maka kalih
Desa dinas desa adat
Sami pada makta sulur
Nyulur indik kesukertan
Yan upami maka kalih marabian
Desa dinas sane lanang
Pinaka I aji yukti
Ngayah ring guru wisesa
Ngamargian sapitutuh
Ring desa adat I biyang
Ngardi trepti
Tunggal ring pasemetonan
Ring kahuripan punika
Desa sane maka kalih
Prajurune patut tatas
Nenten pacang pati kaplug
Santukan nuntun I krama
Ngeranjing kalih
Mewasta dados kelihan
(Pupuh Ginada dari Geguritan Desa Adat di Bali oleh Ni Made Sri 
Arwati, MPLA Bali, 1990/1991)
The pupuh—traditional Balinese song—above tells the tale of two Ba-
linese villages, a customary village and an administrative village, and 
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portrays them as husband and wife. The husband, the personification 
of the administrative village, is mandated to serve the guru wisesa, the 
government. His obligation is to maintain order in accordance with 
the state’s commands and interests. The wife, the customary village, is 
tasked to preserve the unity and harmony of traditions, religions, and 
culture among the krama, the people, of Bali. The two villages co-exist 
in harmony in guiding the people to order. The relation between the 
villages symbolizes the diversity of dresta (traditions) and their practices. 
Meanwhile, the state is present to organize their heterogeneity. These 
arrangements are known as Desa Mawacara, Negara Mawatata.1 
The portrayed harmony between the two villages has had a long 
history. The ebb and flow of governance duality in Bali predate the 
colonial era. Based on a Balinese artifact, the customary villages were 
previously known as karaman. During pre-Hindu times, communities 
banded together in what was called the wanua. A wanua was recognized 
as a legal entity under the leadership of the sanat, tuha-tuha or talaga. 
All three words—sanat, tuha, and talaga—carry the same meaning: 
the elderly. The wanua or karaman provided crucial resources for the 
Balinese kingdoms. They act as realms for kingdoms to sustain their 
powers (Dharmayuda 1995, 28–9; Goris 1954; Schulte Nordholt 2006). 
Rigg’s (1994) study of Southeast Asian villages painted a picture 
of communities with egalitarian values and strong autonomy, reliance 
on subsistence, and tranquility and social values forged by history. As 
described in Schulte Nordholt’s (2006) examination of the Dutch bu-
reaucracy in Bali, the traditional irrigation system for rice fields was 
called a subak. Kings and local official formed a group of subak. Their 
leader was called the sedahan. Along with the mekel, the village leaders 
assigned to regulate community order, the sedahan connected the royal 
palace with the people. The main duty of the mekel was to mobilize 
the people to serve the palace. 
The group of officials consisted of people with connections or fa-
milial relations with the kings and local rulers. They were people of 
1 Balinese philosophy allows customary villages to have their own way of managing their ter-
ritories while the state has the power to control the different methods.
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nobility; only they could assume those positions. It was through such 
mechanisms that supra-village powers consolidated their presence in 
the villages in Bali. However, the relations between the people and the 
rulers were dynamic; the people and their interests were not always 
sidelined by the interests of the supra-village powers. 
The political power of the Balinese kings was represented by their 
possessions (druwe), as manifested in mobilized human resources. This 
relation between the rulers and their followers was not stable. The kings 
had certain obligations toward their followers and servants, and were 
expected to grant them rewards for their loyalty. Kings could not merely 
dispense orders; they were also expected to motivate their people. 
It was not unusual for villages to secede or break away from the 
dominions by which they were ruled. Secession tended to occur when 
villages felt insecure or unaccommodated by their rulers. In such situ-
ations, villages would transfer their loyalty to other local rulers or king-
doms that they deemed more capable of providing security and protec-
tion. Thus it was that villages’ loyalty and attachment to their rulers 
were not permanent, but rather relied on the dynamics and contexts of 
political relations (Gunawan 2014, 109–10). 
The enactment last year of Regional Regulation No. 4/2019 on Cus-
tomary Villages in Bali brought crucial momentum for the penetration 
of supra-village powers into the customary villages. It was further ce-
mented by the formation of the provincial Dinas Pemajuan Masyara-
kat Adat (Indigenous Peoples Development Agency, or DPMA). The 
bendesa (leaders) of the Balinese customary villages were also involved 
in the Majelis Desa Adat (Customary Village Assembly (MDA)) of Bali. 
Along with the DPMA, they manage some IDR 300 million in govern-
ment funds. The passing of the Regional Regulation on Customary 
Villages in Bali was the state’s attempt to still retain some control over 
the villages. 
During the Covid-19 pandemic in Bali, the Provincial Governor, 
together with the MDA of Bali, initiated the formation of the gotong-
royong—loosely translated as cooperation—Covid-19 Task Force in Bali, 
which utilized the Balinese customary villages as its foundation. The 
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policy was formulated as a program to empower the karma, the people, 
of the customary villages and the yowana (youth) to mitigate the virus, 
in both the sekala (seen) and niskala (unseen) realms. The state placed 
the customary villages at the front lines of that effort.2 
This article explores the implementation of the policy to form the 
customary village-based Covid-19 Task Force in Bali. It emphasizes 
the application of rational choice by Bali Governor I Wayan Koster to 
place the province’s customary villages on the frontline of the Covid-19 
effort. The decision to make customary villages a grassroots extension 
of the state was made through the promulgation of the Regional Regu-
lation of Customary Villages. It was through this instrument that the 
Balinese customary villages became tools for the use and fulfillment 
of the state’s interests.
The first section of this paper highlights the implications of the 
Regional Regulation on Customary Villages as an attack on the inde-
pendence of the villages. The second part analyzes the responses of the 
people—the pecalang3 and prajuru (officials) who spearheaded the fight 
against Covid-19. These people have been the executors of the Gover-
nor’s and MDA of Bali’s joint decree on the “Gotong-Royong Customary 
Village-Based Task Force for the Prevention of the Covid-19.”
LITER ATUR E R EV IEW
Studies of colonial era customary villages have portrayed Balinese cus-
tomary villages as exotic and autonomous. Portraits of colonial rule 
have forged this imagery of the villages, which played a part in the 
strategy to exert power over them. Liefrinck (1927), a colonial Dutch 
administrative official who resided in Buleleng, studied the ancient vil-
lages in North Bali between 1886-1887, illustrating them as exotic and 
free from the influence of the outside world. This orientalist and exotic 
perspective implied that Balinese villages resembled small republics 
2 See the Joint Decree by the Governor of Bali and Customary Village Assembly of Bali No. 
472/1571/PPDA/DPMA and No. 05/SK/MDA-Prov Bali/III/2020 on the Formation of the Cus-
tomary Village-Based Gotong-Royong Task Force for the Prevention of Covid-19.
3 Balinese Hindu community traditional police who wear Balinese traditional clothes in car-
rying out their duties.
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with their own set of legal or cultural arrangements. Their government 
structures were viewed as democratic, inasmuch as every individual was 
recognized to have the same and equal legal rights. Those chosen as 
leaders were those who had stayed in the villages the longest, or tetua. 
Conceptually, the Balinese villages were described as sovereign areas 
with their own governments, untouched by external powers (Leifrinck 
1927; Parimartha 2013, 61). 
This construction of colonial narratives that regard these villages 
as autonomous entities was reinforced by Korn (1932). He called them 
Dorpsrepubliek, village republics that were autonomous, democratic, 
and enclosed. He arrived at that conclusion following his exploration 
of Tenganan Village, Karangasem. The image of Balinese custom-
ary villages as free and autonomous village republics was created and 
sustained by the colonial Dutch bureaucracy. That portrayal was ac-
complished through the accumulation and reiteration of knowledge by 
colonial bureaucrats and ethnologists. Parimartha (2013, 62) pointed 
out that the works and construction of colonial political culture by 
Lienfrinck were efforts to undermine the authority and roles of royal 
families toward the villages in Bali. 
The colonial political culture constructed and sustained by Liefrinck 
and Korn was intended to ensure that Bali remained unspoiled. This 
required that the villages remain free from external influence. At the 
time, the Dutch employed a colonial strategy known as Baliseering,4 
or the “Balinization of Bali.” The gist of Baliseering was to leave, if not 
protect, the Balinese to carry out their own lifestyles, which were viewed 
as “beautiful and free,” from interference. The Balinese, with their 
unique culture, were regarded as a “living museum” whose existence 
must be protected and preserved. 
This tradition was utilized by the Dutch colonial rulers for their 
administration’s interests. The Dutch built their bureaucratic network 
from the lowest levels of society. They developed their colonial ad-
4 Cultural political movement carried out by the Dutch colonial government to maintain Ba-
linese traditionalism in its customs and culture. The goal was to make Bali a living cultural 
museum untouched by the outside world.
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ministration dienst, or administrative villages, that did not disturb the 
customary villages, which had existed since the pre-colonial period 
(1910–1920s). The administrative villages were built to conduct admin-
isterial and political affairs, while the traditional villages were related to 
customary governance, remaining autonomous in accordance with the 
colonial strategy of Baliseering (Schulte Nordholt 1991; 1994; Robinson 
2005; Gunawan 2014, 119–22). 
The construction of narratives by the Dutch during their colonial 
rule had much to do with their desire to conserve the Balinese villages, 
free from the control of the palace and the influence of Islam. This 
ambition was in accordance with the Baliseering ideology. The power 
of supra-villages has always influenced the development of villages. 
The Dutch administration aspired to shield the Balinese traditional 
villages from external influence, but at the same time they introduced 
a scheme that turned out to play a major part in the development of 
Balinese customary villages. 
Post-colonial Bali did not escape the clutches of cooptation. If previ-
ously it was colonial rule that exerted its authority over the villages, in the 
post-colonial era, it was the state that imposed regulations to penetrate 
these very traditional institutions. The enactment of Laws Nos. 5/1974 
and 5/1975 replaced the roles of cultural leaders—whether elected or ap-
pointed—with village head who have been screened by the state. These 
head of villages were then tasked to conform and work within the na-
tional bureaucratic structures (Henley and Davidson 2010, 13). 
During the authoritarian New Order, traditional villages faced fur-
ther challenges but persevered. This was well exemplified by the enact-
ment of Bali’s Regional Regulation No. 6/1986. The regulation ruled 
that the customary villages function as dresta villages, or as legal cus-
tomary entities within Bali’s First Level Area. The villages were recog-
nized to have their own Hindu traditions and customs, which have been 
passed on between generations within the Khayangan Tiga, and their 
own territories and resources, as well the autonomy to manage them. 
This regulation was later replaced with Regional Regulation No. 3/2003 
on Pakraman Villages. The term “pakraman villages” was introduced to 
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replace “customary villages,” which were used in the previous regional 
regulation, but the substance of the provisions remained the same. 
Recently, the government issued Regional Regulation No. 4/2019 on 
Customary Villages in Bali. This regulation introduced new provisions 
on the concept of Sad Kerthi, the foundational philosophy of Governor 
I Wayan Koster and Soekarno’s Tri Sakti. The policy recognized cus-
tomary villages as legal customary entities with their own regions, stand-
ing, indigenous structures, customary rights, traditions, and resources. 
These attributes were understood to be passed on between generations 
within the kahyangan tiga. Customary villages had the rights and au-
thority to arrange their own affairs. 
The customary villages were also recognized to rest upon the phi-
losophy of Tri Hita Karana, which stemmed from the local wisdom 
Sad Kerthi and the Hindu and Balinese cultural values. Along with 
the Balinese local wisdom, these foundations played a significant role 
in the development of the communities, making their preservation and 
protection necessary for the maintenance of a sovereign, economically 
independent, and culturally rich Balinese krama. 
The perpetuated cooptation of customary villages by supra-village 
powers was apparent. Criticisms of the romanticism and ambition to 
“sterilize” customary villages with the aim to coopt them with the state’s 
political powers were not new. The same tactic could be found in other 
regions in Southeast Asia, where many villages were influenced by 
supra-village powers. The instruments to exercise control over tradi-
tional villages alone have had their own long history. Villages were 
never fully free from external control and pressure. In such contexts, 
tensions between internal and external powers were common, with their 
implications often associated with social change. 
Scott’s (2009) study showed that villages in Southeast Asia were 
never free from the penetration of outside forces nor the state. Such 
influences came in the form of kingdoms, colonial rule, or national gov-
ernment control. Villages, particularly those in the mountainous areas 
of Southeast Asia, have long wielded strategies to remain autonomous 
from supra-village powers, especially those of the state. 
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Balinese villages have experienced shifts throughout their history 
due to the intervention of external forces. Interactions between custom-
ary and administrative villages underwent frictions caused by influences 
from the outside, such as reforms and policies exercised over custom-
ary villages. Within those processes, however, the external forces were 
neither continuous nor stand-alone factors for change. The external 
forces aimed to inspire the Balinese to organically reform their inter-
nal village structures. However, their implementation was not without 
challenges. The issue of their loyalty, as well as the opposition of cus-
tomary villages against such authorities depended on the contexts and 
power relations between them. Such contexts comprised instruments of 
regulation, cooptation, and arrangements of funds in establishing the 
power networks and relations between customary villages and the state. 
According to Schulte Nordholt (1991), it is important to examine the 
relations between the “modern” state that aspires to expand its political 
power and the accumulation of capital and the traditional institutions 
that wish to preserve their traditions and authority. During the New Or-
der, the state enforced the depoliticization of the Balinese by utilizing 
the Balinese traditions and rituals to exert state control over the region. 
The Baliseering perspective and depoliticization are being replicated 
today. The strategy has been instrumentalized through a variety of 
regulations that exert control over the customary villages. 
The enactment of regulations and depoliticization against customary 
villages made the communities susceptible to exclusion from their own 
political environments and aspirations. Acciaioli and Nasrum (2020) 
referred to such contexts of marginalization as frontierization. This 
concept took inspiration from the idea of fluid social zones between 
rulers and the ruled in institutional and social complexities. 
Acciaioli and Nasrum (2020, 59), who adopted Tsing’s (2005) con-
cept of frontier, also cited that of Geiger (2008), who referred to these 
areas as, “remote from political centers which hold strategic significance 
or economic potentials for human exploitation, and are contested by social 
formations of unequal power.” 
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The Governor of Bali, the Head of Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia 
(PHDI), and Head of the Majelis Desa Adat (MDA) have passed a number of 
policies during the Covid-19 pandemic (photo: Antara/Fikri Yusuf)
R ESEA RCH METHODS
The various state policies on customary villages are strongly linked to 
the desire to improve the state’s developmental strategies, which were 
initiated by the state, their apparatus, and their interest groups. These 
policies were constructed within the framework of governmentality. 
Within this framework, it is necessary to consider the issue of “imagi-
nation,” especially pertaining to the imagination of intervention by the 
state against customary villages (Prahara 2018).
This perspective was derived from a critique by Ferguson (1990), that 
asserted that development with emphasis on technical programs have 
depoliticized communities. Developmental interventions have reduced 
the complexities and problems of people’s livelihoods to mere technical 
matters. The technicalization of issues in development have paved the 
way for the consolidation of technocratic regimes. 
In the context of the state and customary villages, governmentality 
was established through a set of regulations and their executors: the 
state apparatus and its networks. Its purpose was to improve village 
situations that were considered problematic. Unfortunately, this will to 
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improve such situations was not fully altruistic, but rather founded on 
the interest to expand power. This desire did not arise in a vacuum. 
Li (2012, 11), quoting Foucault, wrote,
Defined succinctly as the “conduct of conduct,” government is the 
attempt to shape human conduct by calculated means. Distinct from 
discipline, which seeks to reform designated groups through detailed 
supervision in confined quarters (prisons, asylums, schools), the con-
cern of government is the wellbeing of populations at large.
The will to improve through governmentality was packaged with the 
image of ensuring the people’s welfare, lengthening their life expectan-
cy, and improving their healthcare, among other aspects. It was based 
on these narratives that governmentality was said to configure habits, 
aspirations, and beliefs. 
The governmental rationality was to formulate “the right manner of 
disposing things,” in the pursuit of achieving not one dogmatic goal, 
but rather “a whole series of specific finalities” to be achieved through 
“multiform tactics.” (Li 2012, 6). Calculations were thus prioritized, as 
governmentality requires the selection of “right methods,” the prioriti-
zation of “finalities,” and the fine-tuning of tactics to achieve optimal 
results (Li 2012, 6). Calculations, in turn, demand the illustration of 
tactics in technical terms. Only then can specific interventions be de-
vised (Li 2012, 11–3). 
At the policy level, rulers formulate policies with the guidance of a 
technocratic regime. Public officials—in the context of this article, the 
Governor of Bali—are fully aware when applying the rational choice 
theory. The theory’s main argument is that all sets of policies are found-
ed on the interests of rulers to maintain their power. The rational choice 
theory at the individual level states that individuals’ interests and moti-
vations shape the actions that they take, through the assessment of cost 
and benefits of each action. Individuals are rational beings in their own 
right. Another important perspective is that individuals have autonomy 
in choosing the routes to fulfill their interests (Savirani 2007, 94). 
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A banner of a customary village based Covid-19 Task Force in 
a village in Denpasar (photo: I Ngurah Suryawan) 
Gaddes (1993) asserted that when an individual is positioned as the 
highest bearer of executive powers, there are three things that they will 
attempt to do. First, they will ensure that they remain in power, at the 
very least during their expected term of leadership. Second, they will 
generate a loyal political machine to support them. Third, they will 
aim to govern effectively. An effective government is one that fulfills 
the functions of regulation, control, and serving the people. 
This paper employs a discursive method to analyze information and 
texts in mass media. Apart from the use of discourse analysis to make 
sense of texts in mass media, participatory observation and in-depth 
interviews were also conducted. Information was gathered and com-
piled from news and field observation conducted during the Covid-19 
pandemic. More specifically, the texts in reference were Regional Regu-
lation No. 4/2019 on Customary Villages in Bali, Joint Decree by the 
Governor of Bali and Customary Village Assembly of Bali No. 472/1571/
PPDA/DPMA and No. 05/SK/MDA-Prov Bali/III/2020 on the Forma-
tion of the Customary Village-Based Gotong-Royong Task Force for the 
Prevention of Covid-19. 
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The main targets of the discourse analysis were news—both on- and 
offline—that discussed the formation of Bali’s customary village-based 
Covid-19 Task Force as well as public response to the policy, as they 
are critical to the arguments conveyed in this article. The pecalang¸ the 
traditional security officers in Bali’s customary villages, played a very 
important role as they were at the frontlines of the customary village-
based mitigation of Covid-19. 
R ESULTS A ND DISCUSSION
Many Balinese responded joyfully to the enactment of Regional Regu-
lation No. 5/2019 on Customary Villages. The signing of an artifact 
was performed in celebration of the regulation’s promulgation on June 
4, 2019 at Pura Samuan Tiga, Gianyar. The event was widely viewed 
as the beginning of the “New Bali” momentum, strengthening Bali’s 
“Cultural Guards.” Some even envisioned the return of Bali’s glory. 
The regulation was viewed as a form of protection, a legal umbrella 
for the survival of customary villages—desa adat—which was previously 
recognized as desa pakraman in Regional Regulation No. 3/2001.
However, the new regulation did draw some public controversy. 
Among the issues that caught the most attention were: 
• the new terms for Lembaga Perkreditan Desa (LPD), a village-
owned financial institution, which was changed to Labda Pec-
ingkreman Desa; 
• the arrangement of funds for the pecalang; 
• the mechanism of choosing bendesa adat or tribal leaders 
through consensus; and 
• the allocation of funds from both the regional and national gov-
ernments. 
This regional regulation, which comprised 19 chapters and 103 articles, 
was accepted without significant resistance. The process went smoothly, 
as the Balinese public offered their solid support without substantial 
criticism. 
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One issue that did draw sharp rebuke was the absence of academic 
or research papers for the bill, which went uncondemned. It was as if 
the academic paper that was supposed to act as the foundation for the 
drafting of the bill was not regarded as important. This was in contrast 
to the formally recognized vital function of academic papers in the 
legislative process. It is through research and the writing of academic 
papers that the complexities of issues are thoroughly mapped and dis-
cussed. Although the issuance of a regulation simplifies the subjects for 
whom the set of rules are made, at least the underlying problems are 
analyzed and understood. Unfortunately, the drafting of the Regional 
Regulation on Customary Villages dismissed the critical nature of this 
process. 
The empowerment of the Balinese customary villages on December 
12, 2018 was met with euphoria. That, too, took place at Pura Samuan 
Tiga, Gianyar. At the time, the event was called Paruman Agung Kra-
ma Bali. The main agenda of the ceremony was the declaration of 
Samuan Tiga for the strengthening of the Balinese customary villages. 
The voices of the Balinese krama representation were made to sound 
homogenous by the tribal, bureaucratic, and political elites. It was as 
though they had made history in the development and empowerment 
of customary villages. 
The customary villages, previously recognized as desa adat, changed 
to desa pakraman, then back to desa adat. They played a significant role 
in the history and political discourse of Balinese culture. The banjar5 
were significant for the gathering of the innocents throughout 1965-
1966 when there were mass killings (kene garis mati). Robinson (2005) 
urged the study of the historical context of these events as well as their 
sites. I agree with Robinson (2005) that this series of events made a 
major turn in Bali’s—and the country’s—history. The banjar in custom-
ary villages, with their setra (cemetery) and other historical sites, were 
wisdoms—living history—in our day-to-day lives. During the period of 
Golkar in the 1970’s and 1980’s, customary villages became domains for 
5 The smallest community that is the buffer of the traditional village. One village can consist 
of several banjars.
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mass mobilization. The banjar and their communities became targets 
of Kuningisasi—loosely translated as the “process of becoming or being 
made yellow,” the color of Golkar—against the Indonesian National 
Party (PNI), that was previously in conflict with the Communist Party 
(PKI). 
The traditional villages were not free from intervention during the 
dictatorship of the New Order. The issues of empowerment and com-
petition between customary villages were highly popular. During those 
times, the villages provided large political bases for Golkar. The events 
of “kebulatan tekad”—determination—deeply immersed the banjar in 
political interests. In return, the villages were gifted funds for their 
loyalty and adherence to their tradition. This tactic was well-devised 
and crafted by the political elites. 
The transition between regimes did not diminish the narratives 
of state-endorsed empowerment and development. These narratives 
served as sacred and effective tools to portray the will to improve the 
livelihoods of communities in customary villages, who were viewed 
as helpless. The competitions did not stop, but instead became more 
entrenched with the Tri Sandya worship contests, setra (burial) contests, 
and jegeg bagus sekaa teruna or youth organizations. Mesima krama—
dialog, discussions— were also perpetuated to gain political support 
and funds, such as social aid and grants. The villages were never free 
from politics. 
The practice of governmentality, through the implementation of 
development and empowerment programs, suggested the existence of 
an external threat. I still remember how restless we were when our 
Pretima—part of the Balinese temple—started disappearing from our 
temples. We placed the blame on the immigrants, whom we called Nak 
Jawa, Jelme Dauh Tukad. We immediately set up protection, announced 
“Pemulung Dilarang Masuk”—loosely translated as “Beggars Cannot 
Enter”—screened newcomers or non-Balinese, and treated them with 
arrogance. We were prejudiced and racist. 
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Customary village officials and the pecalang have always been targets of state-sponsored 
development and empowerment policies. (photo: Adrian Suwanto/Radar Bali)
The perceived external threat and the will to improve occurred hand-in-
hand. The enactment of the Regional Regulation on Customary Villag-
es was assumed to stem from these perceptions. Politics was not absent 
from the “good will” to provide institutional protection. We learned that 
customary villages, with their intricate regulations, tended to exclude 
their own people. Within the internal structures of the villages, com-
munity representatives and tribal leaders were provided room to accu-
mulate political and economic capital. These practices were evident. 
According to Li’s (2012) argument, the practice of accumulating 
power can be translated into the issuance of rules and regulations. The 
strategies of governmentality that manifested in various policies were 
initially intended to empower the people of Bali through the protection 
and preservation of their traditions and customary villages. Through 
the perspective of governmentality and power, the will to improve the 
Balinese customary villages was not as genuine as portrayed. This will 
was now within the realm of political power. 
Balinese traditional villages were given the heavy task to protect and 
preserve Balinese culture. Boldly and courageously, we called for the 
strengthening of our traditions and customary villages. Our demands 
were manifested in the enactment of regional regulations. We should 
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revisit and examine our thoughts about our villages. When we were 
in our villages, we truly internalized what it meant to be Balinese. If 
we were to be honest, our attitudes toward preservation were forms of 
nostalgic romanticism. We aspired to bring back the glories of the past 
to the contemporary world. Is this our perspective toward customary 
villages?
The utopian dream of village empowerment must not be enshrined 
above the respect for differences. It has often been expressed that efforts 
to consolidate customary villages tend to lead to “cultural violence,” 
which more often than not scars the communities who are excluded 
from their own institutions. In 2007, Dharma Palguna wrote,
Comfort and a sense of safety occur within sincere and genuine 
bargaining between individuals and the institutions that claim to 
act on behalf of the collective will. Without room for differences, 
humans will be destroyed by their created institutions. Before long, 
those very institutions will crumble and collapse on the very people 
whose lives they’ve devoured.
He continued, observing that cultures and traditions were human cre-
ations intended to provide comfort. However, often when they grow too 
strong, they become threats. I suspect that the regional regulations that 
we supported for our customary villages may in turn transform them 
into political commodities. The masterminds behind such schemes 
were clearly elites who depicted themselves as protectors of our villages, 
but instead desired and benefited from access to the economic and 
political gains to maintain their power. 
Bali’s provincial regulations that targeted the livelihoods of people 
at the grassroots, consistently involved customary villages attempting to 
mitigate Covid-19. The provincial government’s advert in the Harian 
Bali Post on May 4, 2020, highlighted the 10 policies enacted by Bali 
Governor I Wayan Koster in the fight against the pandemic. The first 
was the formation of the Covid-19 Task Force through Bali’s Guberna-
torial Decree No. 236/03-B/HK/2020 on March 10, 2020. Bali was the 
first province in Indonesia to form a Covid-19 Task Force, even before 
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the central government set up its own Task Force for the Acceleration 
of Mitigation of Covid-19 on March 13, 2020. 
The second policy was the state of awareness issued three days later, 
through Letter of Statement No. 360/3054/SET/BPBD. That was en-
acted on the same date through Gubernatorial Decree No. 258/04-
G/HK/2020. The third policy was Circular Letter No. 7194/2020 on 
March 16 that mandated the closure of schools and advised students 
to study from home using online media, the fulfillment of government 
administrative tasks from home, the suspension of government travels, 
with exemptions for emergencies and other urgent matters, and restric-
tions of mass gatherings. The fourth policy was the appointment of 11 
referral hospitals for the treatment of Covid-19 through Bali’s Guberna-
torial Decree No. 259/03-B/HK/2020, also issued on March 16. 
Fifth, the government issued the closure of tourist sites through Cir-
cular Letter No. 730/8080/Sekret on March 20, 2020. The sixth was the 
instruction to restrict mass gatherings, including tajen or cockfighting 
through Circular Letter No. 730/8125/Sekret on the same date. The 
next action that Governor Koster took was the issuance of a directive 
for people to practice physical distancing—to not congregate, mini-
mize interactions, minimize outdoor activities, and to work and pray 
from home. This policy also included the call to suspend all traditional 
and religious rituals involving mass gatherings. The Governor advised 
people to postpone travel to and from the province unless for urgent 
matters and for foreigners to return to their home countries. Border re-
strictions were to be tightened and officials were instructed to increase 
monitoring over travelers and to remind them to abide by the Covid-19 
protocols. 
The eighth policy was Bali Gubernatorial Instruction No. 8551/2020 
on the Strengthening of the Prevention and Handling of Covid-19 in 
Bali. This instruction reinforced the restrictions on people’s outdoor 
activities by prescribing them to study, work, and worship from home. 
This policy strengthened the restrictions on mass gatherings and tourist 
operations, as it mandated the closure of tourism sites and recreational 
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facilities. The focus of this policy is to limit the practice of traditions 
and religious activities as well as travel.
The ninth decision was the appointment of the University of Uday-
ana’s hospital as an isolation center for Covid-19 patients, as decreed 
through Governor’s Letter No. 800/3521/DisKes on March 27, 2020. 
The tenth was the promulgation of a Joint Decree by the Governor of 
Bali and the Customary Village Assembly of Bali on the Formation of 
the Customary Village-Based Gotong-Royong Task Force for the Pre-
vention of Covid-19 on March 28, 2020. It was through this policy 
that Governor Koster mobilized and organized the customary villages 
in Bali to carry out—sekala (seen) and niskala (unseen)—measures to 
prevent the spread of Covid-19 (Bali Post 2020).
The pecalang were among the ones at the frontline of the fight 
against virus. They played a big part in the aforementioned Covid-19 
Task Force. On March 16, 2020, Governor Koster mandated the for-
mation of Bali’s Covid-19 Gotong-Royong Task Force. The decree was 
made by the Bali Provincial Government, the Customary Village As-
sembly of Bali, and the PHDI of Bali. This task force was financed by 
funds of the customary village that were allocated IDR 300 million 
each. The funds were used for Task Force operations. 
The policy that specifically pertains to the roles of pecalang and the 
customary village-based security system was Gubernatorial Regulation 
No. 26/2020 on Sipandu Beradat (Integrated Customary Village-Based 
Security System). This regulation was founded on the desire to sup-
port customary villages in maintaining their wewidangan—authority. 
Governor Koster stated that the integrated security system was needed 
to maintain the sanctity and harmony of Bali’s natural environment. 
This system was necessary to realize the aspired and idealized—both 
sekala (seen) and niskala (unseen)—livelihood of the krama. 
The aim of this gubernatorial regulation was to achieve and main-
tain order, security, and tranquility, and sustainably protect the regions 
and the krama adat, krama tamiu (visitors or newcomers) and tamiu 
(visitors). Their programs aimed to empower and increase the capacity 
of the pecalang, their infrastructure, and their funding. The Sipandu 
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Beradat were implemented at various levels, namely customary villages, 
counties, municipalities, and the province. The system’s function was 
to collect data that could cause disruption, as well as to analyze reports 
of threats to social order and security. 
Long before the promulgation of this regulation, it was the role—
pecalang ngayah nindihin6—of the pecalang to protect their areas from 
disease. Although they formed part of the Gotong-Royong Task Force, 
the authority of the pecalang was set below that of the customary vil-
lages. Unfortunately, the pecalang and the Task Force were not provided 
with healthcare nor equipped with proper work procedures, which ex-
posed them to health risks.
The pecalang were highly praised during the Reformation in 1998. 
At the time, Balinese youth were excited to become part of the Task 
Force and pecalang for Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P). 
That year (1999), PDI-P held their first congress in Sanur. I witnessed 
how the assembly was joyfully celebrated, even at the banjar level. The 
positions of pecalang to safeguard the congress were popularly adver-
tised. Being a pecalang and official of the Task Force was seen as ad-
mirable. 
I suppose it was these moments that the role of pecalang as a rep-
resentation of traditional Balinese culture made a comeback. After the 
first PDI-P congress, the terms and positions of pecalang blossomed. 
The pecalang became Bali’s guardians. After the pecalang’s success in 
guarding the PDI-P’s congress, pecalang units mushroomed in many 
customary villages. They were provided with their own posts, given full 
equipment, and assigned patrol vehicles by their villages. The pecalang 
acted as security officers in the screening of newcomers and mainte-
nance of security after the Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005 as well as 
for concerts. The pecalang were present in almost every event. 
6 Balinese traditional security guards work together to protect the territory of their respective 
traditional villages.
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A pecalang on duty (Photo: Fikri Yusuf/Antara)
During the Covid-19 pandemic, the pecalang returned to the frontlines. 
If it were political parties that previously endorsed their emergence, 
it was now the state that involved them in the fight to fend off the 
pandemic. The pecalang were so flexible that they could be utilized 
by many. The awareness and perceived efficacy of the pecalang had 
much to do with the current discourse in Balinese culture that re-
gards disasters and chaos as external attributes. This contrarian view 
has contributed to the prejudice against immigrants as sources of chaos 
and trouble, while the Balinese are seen as maintainers of order and 
traditions. Based on this narrative, “Bali” was envisioned as an entity 
with clear boundaries, living in its own space (the Bali Island), with its 
own language (the Balinese language) and lifestyle (the Balinese tradi-
tion), and its own religion (Hindu). The discourse around threats and 
need for preparedness was represented by the presence of the pecalang 
(Santikarma 2004, 123–24). 
The pecalang’s duty during the pandemic includes limiting people’s 
migration. Yet, were the pecalang equipped with health protocols to en-
sure their safety? Although they are dedicated to their regions, the state 
needs to ensure their wellbeing. They should not be treated as mere 
pawns on the frontline in the fight against the pandemic. Although 
they appear strong, devoted, and supported through their involvement 
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in many policies, the pecalang are also humans who should be treated 
as such.
I Putu W, a kertha banjar (advisor) in a customary village on the 
outskirts of Denpasar said there was an overlap of duties between cus-
tomary and administrative villages in the handling of the pandemic. 
These two types of villages in Bali formed their own task forces. The 
performance of their duties was not as smooth as it appeared on paper. 
The customary villages perceived the formation of the gotong-royong 
task force as the allocation of strategic funds. The IDR 300 million 
funding became the target. In this context, Putu W observed that the 
elites competed to gain access to those funds—the formation of task 
forces was seen as access to money (Interview with I Putu W, May 2 
and May 8, 2020).
The swamp of policies and instructions were not comparable to the 
ability of the state to ease the communities’ livelihoods. I Nyoman S, 
an official in Denpasar complained about this problem. “We’re filled 
with all these guidelines and instructions, there’s nothing else,” he said, 
referring to the failure of the state to provide basic necessities for the 
people. The goods were instead provided by village institutions, such as 
the banjar, traditional villages, LPD, and donations by businesspersons 
in the area (Interview with I Nyoman S, April 20, and May 15, 2020).
The narrative that went around was that the pecalang performed 
their duties voluntarily. The bendesa of the Beng Customary Village, 
Ida Bagus Putu Bawa, who also took part in the Covid-19 Task Force in 
Beng County, Regency of Gianyar, stated that the efforts to mitigate the 
pandemic were carried out without incentives for the village officials. 
They were given only snacks and meals during the course of their duty. 
Meanwhile, the Beng Customary Village, with its 1,073 families, have 
been made aware of the dangers of Covid-19. 
The Beng community voluntarily followed all the protocols issued 
by the Parisadha Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI) and MDA. Even 
before the issuance of the protocols, the people of Beng have been seri-
ously following the government instructions. The people obeyed them 
because they knew well of the dangers of Covid-19. Many companies 
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in in the village area donated masks, disinfectant, and sanitizers. The 
village asked for donations from businesspersons with businesses in the 
area (Prasetia 2020).
Pecalang imposing social sanctions on people who were 
found without masks (photo: Fikri Yusuf/Antara)
Meanwhile, the Manggala Agung Pasikian Pecalang (head of the pe-
calang association) of Bali, I Made Mudra, told different story. Up until 
May 22, 2020, the pecalang of the Denpasar customary village had not 
been provided any logistical or economic aid, or even health tests. He 
said, 
To this date, there has not been any testing [for the pecalang of 
the Denpasar customary village)]. That was the information I have 
heard—except for myself and several of my pecalang friends who 
were on duty at the Covid-19 post at the Pulau Galang traffic light, 
Imam Bonjol—we worked the afternoon and night shifts. Even 
those tests were given at our requests, and they were only rapid 
tests. Thankfully they turned out negative.
I Made Mudra opined that the pecalang needed to be prioritized to 
access swab and PCR tests as they were on on-site duty. “This is to 
check on their health and prevent the transmission of the Covid-19, 
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as they may be (carriers) without symptoms,” he said. He hoped that 
the government would listen to the complaints of the pecalang in Bali, 
who have been heavily involved in the efforts to educate people in their 
own areas despite the lack of aid from the government, state-owned 
enterprises, and regional companies. “…(We had) nothing. We were 
only given meals by people who cared, but nobody does that anymore. 
We bring our own meals now.” (Radar Bali 2020). 
CONCLUSION
The formation of the customary village-based gotong-royong task force 
was found to represent the interests of the state by exerting control over 
the Balinese customary villages. The pecalang and officials of the vil-
lages spearheaded the fight against Covid-19. Prior to the pandemic, 
the customary villages had been coopted and made to work within the 
state’s structures through the enactment of Regional Regulation No. 
4/2019. The state utilized the social capital and influence that villages 
have over their communities. The villages were effective tools in the 
handling of the pandemic. The state’s policy to form gotong-royong task 
forces was a rational choice; it has benefited the state by advertising its 
presence as responsible caregivers for the people.
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